Pol Pot\u27s Allies: The Kampuchean Right by Kiernan, Ben
POL POT S ALLIES: 
The Right in Kampuchea
30 A US TR A LI A N  L E F T  R E V I E W
Ben Kiernan
L ast December, in the midst of the “Iran-Contra Affair”, the US Congressional Research Service 
revealed that Washington has given 
the ousted Pol Pot forces of 
“Democratic Kampuchea” (or DK, 
otherwise known as the Khmer 
Rouge) a massive $85 million in aid 
since their overthrow by Vietnamese 
troops in 1979. This secret aid to Pol 
Pot had always been vigorously denied 
by US officials. They preferred to 
emphasise their support for a small 
rightwing group which they hoped 
w ould  p ro v id e  a f ig - le a f  o f  
respectability for an anti-Vietnamese 
strategy based on the Khmer Rouge,
“ C o a l i t i o n  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  
Democratic Kampuchea”, which from 
exile still represents the country in the 
United Nations, The other two 
factions, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge and 
the followers of Prince Sihanouk, are 
fairly well known. Most people have 
probably never heard of the KPNLF, 
but they had been briefly in the news.
In April 1985, as the campaign to 
once again provide US arms aid to 
anti-communist forces in Indochina 
gathered momentum, the Washington 
Post categorised the Khmer People’s 
N a t io n a l  L ib e ra t io n  F ro n t  as 
“reasonably democratic”. The next 
month, the Post published a plea for 
military aid to the KPNLF by 
Congressman Stephen J. Solarz. This 
was entitled “ Help the Democratic
who murdered or starved to death over 
a million people when they ruled 
Kampuchea from 1975 to 1979.
“ INSIDE KAMPUCHEA: And 
Getting out Alive” read the headline in 
Rupert Murdoch's Australian. The 
chief-of-staff of the Darwin Northern 
Territory News, David Nason, had 
just managed to escape with slight 
wounds after attempting to enter 
V ietnam ese-occupied K ampuchea 
from Thailand with a patrol of armed 
rebels.
The rebels were troops of the 
Khmer People’s National Liberation 
Front (KPNLF), one of the three 
factions allied in the anti-Vietnamese
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Resistance”. In the Atlantic magazine, 
Stephen J. Morris claimed that, with 
the Sihanoukists, the KPNLF forces 
"are the only ones that represent 
n o n t o t a l i t a r i a n  C a m b o d i a n  
nationalism”. According to Morris, 
they are “the authentic representatives 
of Cambodia", and even “the heroic 
s u rv iv o r s  o f  th e  C a m b o d ia n  
holocaust”.1 The last label apparently 
applies, in Morris’ mind, only to these 
allies of the perpetrators of that 
holocaust. In this context it is 
obviously worth examining the 
democratic credentials of the KPNLF, 
which was founded in 1979 by the 
onetime Kampuchean Prime Minister, 
Son Sann.
In late 1979, William Shawcrosss, 
Jimmy Carter and many others 
accused the Vietnamese of committing 
“subtle genocide" by allegedly starving 
the Kampuchean people to death. As 
Shawcross has since ad m itted ,  
however, “there is, fortunately, no 
evidence that large numbers of people 
did starve to death” under the new 
V ie tn a m e s e - in s t a l l e d  P e o p le 's  
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 
government led by Heng Samrin.J But 
in areas of continuing Pol Pot control, 
thousands did perish; it was from these 
frontier areas that skeletal refugees 
crossed the Thai border to be filmed by 
Western television crews.
What is much less well-known is 
that many people were starved to 
d e a t h  in  a r e a s  u n d e r  th e  
administration of the newly-formed 
K PN LF. Like the o ther  an t i-  
Vietnamese forces the KPNLF were 
fighting to control populations, and 
they held a t least 6,000 Khmer civilians 
hostage near the Thai border. Because 
the KPNLF could not feed these 
people but would not allow them to go 
elsewherej nearly 4,000 hostages died 
of starvation in late I979.3
The Western aid that poured into 
the Thai-Kampuchean border in late 
1979 a n d  1980 w as  la rg e ly  
appropriated (as it continues to be 
today) by the Khmer Rouge and by the 
KPNLF, and with Thai help the latter 
gradually took control of a number of 
civilian refugee camps. Over this 
twoyear period, the Westerner best 
placed to observe and analyse the to 
observe and analyse the KPNLF was 
probably Stephen R. Heder, a Khmer­
speaking American under contract to 
the US State Department to gather 
i n f o r m a t i o n  a lo n g  th e  T h a i -  
Kampuchean border. Heder favoured 
sending US arms aid to the KPNLF, 
although by late 1981 he was still not 
very optimistic about its prospects. He 
wrote;
The K P N L F 's  potential as a popular 
alternative to the [P R K , or Heng Samrin] 
regime and the Khmer Rouge is, however, 
still limited. Its social base and social 
appeal is oriented tow ards the  old 
f u n c t i o n a r y / i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  c la s s  o f  
Kampuchea, a social g roup  that was small 
and weak even before 1975, was then 
physically decimated under the Khmer 
Rouge in 1975-78, and has been further 
thinned out by refugee flight since 1979. 
Although it professes a num ber o f  
liberaldemocratic ideals, in the border 
camps under KPNLF control there is not 
even the pretense o f democratic political 
practice. C am p residents are instead ruled 
by a kind of bureaucratic-military 
dictatorship which they complain is 
arbitrary, corrupt and beset with nepotism 
and cronyism ... If  more a rm s  were 
available to  it, the K P N L F  could with little 
difficulty further expand its armed forces, 
perhaps even double or triple them, bu t 
without a broadening of its social base and 
im provement in its political practice, it 
could not achieve continuous popular 
expansion.4
One year later, a Khmer-speaking 
F re n c h  a g r o n o m i s t ,  F r a n c o i s  
Grunewald, who had spent 17 months 
working among the refugees on the 
Thai-Kampuchean border, concluded 
that the KPNLF still had “no popular 
base" and that it would “never 
mobilise the mass of Cambodian 
peasants behind it”. (However, it had 
managed to enlist a number of Thai 
regular troops, who fought, disguised 
as KPNLF forces, in operations 
ag a in s t  th e  V ie tn am ese  inside  
Kampuchea, according to “certain 
highly-placed sources in Son Sann’s 
general s ta ff’, Grunewald reported.)
As for the “political practice” of 
the KPNLF, it had not improved 
much since Heder had voiced his 
doubts the year before. Grunewald 
recorded instances o f  K P N L F  
gangsterism, diversion of aid, and 
c o r r u p t io n  sca n d a ls .  In 1982, 
moreover, foreign aid workers in 
Sakeo camp in Thailand were 
threatened with death by KPNLF
troops if they did not hand over 
Khmer orphans about to be sent for 
resettlement in third countries. The 
Westerners were told to pressure the 
orphans to join Son Sann’s forces on 
the border instead.
According to Grunewald, civilian 
refugees were still being held hostage
The western aid that  
poured into the Thai- 
Kampuchean border in late 
1979 and 1980 was largely 
appropriated ... by the 
Khmer Rouge and the 
KPNLF.
in KPNLF border camps, “by force if 
necessary”. In one case, a young 
pregnant woman planning to go on to 
Khao-I-Dang holding centre (10 miles 
inside Thailand) was arrested and 
beaten up until she miscarried, then 
jailed in the KPNLF prison at Nong 
Chan and eventually forced to marry a 
K P N L F  s o ld i e r .  T he  p r i s o n  
conditions were extremely primitive, 
especially for Vietnamese refugees 
held by the KPNLF. Vietnamese 
refugee women were regularly raped, 
one woman up to thirteen times on her 
first day of detention. The Red Cross 
were “horrified” at the conditions in 
KPNLF prisons; it took three months 
o f  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  A m n e s t y  
International in 1982justtogetatoilet 
installed for the women prisoners. But 
otherwise, Grunewald concluded, 
‘noone decided to put pressure on the 
KPNLF, even though given its 
dependence on humanitarian aid, that 
would be easy ... ”
In October 1982. a KPNLF 
“ re g im e n ta l  commander** was 
assassinated in an internecine purge. 
According to the Far Eastern 
Economic Review (5 November 1982), 
he was shot “in the civilian sector of 
the KPNLF’s Ban Sa-Ngae camp ... 
when shooting erupted from the 
compound of the front’s cadretraining 
school”. This led to the resignation of 
the KPNLF’s chief-of-staff, Dien Delv 
who accepted “ultimate responsibil­
ity” for the murder. Observers noted
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that Del had disapproved of the 
victim’s money-making ventures, 
including a video cafe in a border 
camp, where pornographic films were 
screened three times a day.
In May 1983, the K PN L Fsetupa 
guerrilla training school for about 
1,200 recruits from the refugee camps. 
They do not seem to have been very 
willing recruits, for several hundred 
defected within weeks. The total 
number of escapees from the school 
soon reached 600. As Paul Quinn- 
Judge of the Far Eastern Economic 
Review  reported (13 October 1983):
Deserters who were picked up by K P N L F  
authorit ies are said to  have received fairly 
rough treatment. An order posted in some 
K PN  LF camps later reportedly said the 
heads of captured deserters had been 
shaved and marked. The deserters had also 
been banished from K P N L F  camps, the 
order said.
In September 1983, a Western 
doctor completed his tour of duty at 
Nong Samet, a border camp run by the 
KPNLF, with a population of as many 
as 50,000 refugees. The doctor wrote in 
his report to the board of his 
international aid agency:
Adolescent men with machine guns now 
roam the cam p openly ... The wife of our 
hospital adm in is tra to r in her ninth month 
of  pregnancy experienced her first labor 
pains. S tepping outside her hut, she was 
shot in the head and  died fifty yards from 
our hospital. The administrator,  fearing 
for his life and the lives of his eight 
children, decided to escape the border  for 
third country  resettlement. The gangster 
who controls escape from the border 
demanded that the twenty-year-old 
daughter  be left in the camp and that the 
adminis trator take in her place the 
gangster’s own daughter  who would take 
the abandoned  daughter 's name ...
... The border is inherently an  anarchy that 
will be dom inated  by warlords and 
gangsters an  epiphenomenon: a
constituency not o f  political allegiance [to 
the “Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea"] but o f  dependency on relief 
rice.5
In late 1984 a n o t h e r  K h m e r ­
sp e a k in g  A m e r i c a n ,  M ic h a e l  V ickery ,
visited the Thai-Kampuchean border. 
He met a former prisoner of the Heng 
Samrin regime who had fled there 
a l te r  three m onths  in jail  in 
Kampuchea. “ He said he had not been 
beaten or tortured in prison, but on 
arrival at the border was beaten up 
and robbed by the KPNLF”. Vickery 
continued, to note that “persistent 
reports of violations” of human rights 
PN LF areas “have been current in 
the press and known to workers in the 
refugee camps for years”. At Dangruk 
c a m p ,  V i e t n a m e s e  r e f u g e e s  
complained of “rape, robbery and 
harassment” by KPNLF troops in 
early 1985. An American researcher at 
the border informed Vickery of two 
other cases of alleged KPNLF 
atrocities.
In one instance a PR K  spy disguised as a 
m onk was summarily executed, and in 
ano ther  a defector offering information 
ab ou t  a forthcoming Vietnamese attack 
was killed when his prediction was off by 
two days.6
Since it lost control of all its 
camps in the late 1984 Vietnamese/ 
PRK offensive along the Thai border, 
the KPNLF army has largely kept 
away from Kampuchea. Its forces 
have regrouped near Khao-I-Dang 
refugee holding centre in Thailand, 
and stage regular night raids in which 
at least ten refugees were killed in the 
first quarter of 1985. At one point, up 
to one-third of the KJiao-l-Dang 
population were sheltering around the 
camp hospital each night to protect 
themselves from KPNLF raids.
There is really no evidence which 
would lead to the belief that KPNLF 
rule of Kampuchea would be any more 
“democratic” than the PRK currently 
is, and it would possibly be a good deal 
worse in human rights terms, A 
KPNLF government would no doubt 
bear considerable resemblance to the 
Lon Nol m ili tary  d ic ta to rsh ip  
(1970-75) with which nearly all its 
leading cadres and officers were 
closely associated. (According to 
Heder, “the 10 top political-military 
figures in the Front have their roots in 
the professional officer corps of the 
Sihanouk and Lon Nol armed forces 
... Their historical commitment to
•  The "reasonably democratic" 
KPNLF,
parliamentary government is generally 
much weaker than that of the civilians 
in the Front’s leadership ... ”)7
But the KPNLFin any case could 
be swept aside by their Khmer Rouge 
allies even more easily than the Lon 
Nol Regime was — with genocidal 
results. A Bangkok newspaper 
reported inearly 1985 that the KPNLF 
(and Sihanoukists) had agreed to 
share ammunition, logistical supplies 
and intelligence information with Pol 
Pot’s Khmer Rouge forces. Since then, 
co-operation between the KPNLFand 
the Khmer Rouge has increased 
greatly^ as the experience of journalist 
David Nason showed. He was actually 
rescued from Kampuchea by Pol Pot 
guerrillas who had to come to the aid 
of the beleaguered KPNLF.
In this same period, the US began 
to call the KPNLF “the democratic 
resistance” and to overtly fund its 
military requirements. The prime 
mover behind the idea, Congressman 
Stephen J, Solarz, claimed in The 
Washington Post (7 May ! 985):
With additional supplies and support, the 
non-communist forces could substantially 
increase the num ber of their men under 
arm s and thus intensify the pressure on 
Vietnam ... to  withdraw its troops as part 
o f  a political settlement.
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One would not know from Solarz’ 
statement that only three months 
beforehand, Hanoi had, in fact, 
offered to withdraw, in return for the 
exclusion of Pol Pot and the disarming 
of his followers. It is precisely Son 
Sann, Norodom Sihanouk, Pol Pot 
and their supporters who are refusing 
to discuss such a settlement.® Solarz 
even claims that the USA has “two 
overriding objectives in Cambodia ... 
to secure the withdrawal of Vietnam 
(and) to prevent the return of the 
Khmer Rouge". Though Hanoi is now 
proposing and the non-communists 
are opposing just this, Solarz claims 
that “both these objectives require a 
stronger non-communist resistance 
movement", i.e. stronger opponents of 
the alleged “overriding objectives’’ of 
Washington! One can be forgiven for 
thinking that what really requires a 
stronger non-communist movement is 
the reassertion of US influence over 
Indochina, and that the word 
“democratic" applied to the KPNLF is 
really code for “pro-American" — or 
at least reasonably so ...
W hen  V ie tn a m e s e  fo r c e s  
approached the perimeter of the 
KPNLF base at Ampil in early 1984, 
Michael Richardson of the Melbourne 
Age probably expressed the prevailing 
view among Western observers when 
he wrote:
Ampil is the military headquarters of the 
Front and its loss would be a  grave blow to 
the m o ra le  a n d  s t a n d in g  o f  the  
noncommunist guerrillas.
Later that year, Richardson again 
wrote:
A ground assault against the K P N L F  
headquarters at Ampil is expected soon 
and will be a crucial test of the group's 
ability to  withstand sustained military 
pressure.9
The Far Eastern Economic Review  
reported on 17 January 1985 that 
Ampil’s defenders had “proved no 
match for the onslaught”, and that 
most KPNLF troops had retreated 
into Thailand within a day. But on 
Richardson’s criteria, the KPNLFhad 
failed “a crucial test” and suffered a 
grave blow to its morale and standing. 
The last of the eight KPNLF bases 
soon fell (while the Khmer Rouge and
Sihanoukists also lost their twelve 
camps to the Vietnamese). The group 
fell into disarray, its activities now 
largely restricted to refugee centres in 
Thailand,
According to Western sources, 
the KPNLF is “demoralised and 
disorganised”, and there are reports of 
“sizeable desertions". Its plans to 
switch to guerrilla warfare inside 
Kampuchea “could take much longer 
than expected". Further, according to 
Rodney Tasker of the Far Eastern 
Economic Review:
Prince Sihanouk categorised his 
KPNLF ally’s military capacity as 
“zero”.10
Even a KPNLF soldier in the 
g ro u p ’s head q u ar te rs  told The 
Australian in mid-1985:
I don 't  trust anybody in Kampuchea ... 
Most villages wc come across are inclined 
towards the Heng Samrin regime. In each 
village there is at least one Heng Samrin 
a g e n t ... We never stay long in villages, and 
we never enter (hem at night. It’s too 
dangerous .1*
David Nason’s recent experiences 
w ith  th e  K P N L F  a p p e a r  to  
corroborate this latter statement.
Though the KPNLF had once 
claimed to be Fielding an army of over 
20,000, in early 1986 diplomatic 
sources put total KPNLF and 
S i h a n o u k i s t  s t r e n g t h  i n s id e  
K am puchea at “ 500 guerrillas
The K P N L F  also suffers from the lack o f  a 
clear chain of military com m and and the 
scarcity o f  staff officers with a working 
knowledge o f  how to  prosecute a real 
guerrilla war.
operating a maximum distance of 40 
km from the border” with Thailand. 
On 10 July, the Far Eastern Economic 
Review  reported that the K PN L F“for 
m onths has been incapble of 
p re sen t in g  c o h e re n t  b a t t le f ie ld  
reports".
One reason, apart from military 
activity, was the serious split in the 
KPNLF leadership. In September
1985, Son Sann sacked two members 
of his military command. However, 
they were supported by two others, 
Dien Del and Sak Sutsakhan. In 
December, Sutsakhan struck back, 
staging a mini-coup against Son Sann 
in KPNLF headquarters, in the name 
of a military clique called the 
“Provisional Central Committee for 
Salvation” (PCCS).
Sutsakhan represents the career 
officers corps whose “historical 
co m m itm e n t  to  p a r l i a m e n ta r y  
government", as Heder puts it, “is 
generally much weaker than that of the 
civilians” like Son Sann.
Nevertheless, Sutsakhan’s PCCS 
sub-faction  received firm Thai 
backing. Bangkok officials began to 
channel Western and Chinese money 
and weaponry destined for the 
KPNLF solely to the PCCS, which 
gradually wore down Son Sann’s 
supporters and assumed control of 
their last refugee s trongholds . 
Meanwhile, Dien Del gave up fighting 
and became a Buddhist monk.12
After several months in which the 
large “Site 2” refugee camp, with a 
population of 120,000, had been 
divided between the rival KPNLF 
groupings, Thailand barred Son Sann 
and his son Son Soubert from visiting 
the camp or other sections of the 
Kampuchean border. Sann thus lost 
control over his last K PNLF units and 
refugee supporters.13
R ecen tly ,  a h igh ly -p laced  
KPNLF official said that Thai military 
personnel always accompany KPNLF 
p a tro ls  into  K ampuchea. Thai- 
speaking relief workers in Site 2 say 
that KPNLF troops there call these 
Thai officers wanna, or “chief”. Son 
Sann has been powerless to prevent 
Thai control of his army, although the 
PCCS has suffered even more 
extensive desertions in 1986. while 
civilian refugees have fled Site 2 by the 
hundreds.
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On a visit to Site 2 in January
1986. Chanthou Boua and I spoke 
privately with six low -ranking  
KPNLF members in a section of the 
camp controlled by the PCCS. We 
asked if their overall goal was to have 
Sihanouk and Son Sann return to 
power in Kampuchea. The reply was 
hesitant but revealing: "We dare not 
say ... ” Even privately-expressed 
support for Son Sann, the nominal 
leader of the KPNLF, was considered 
dangerous in this stronghold of the 
faction’s military.
In this same section of Site 2. at least 
18 people died in the first half of 1986 
in violent incidents involving armed 
KPNLF troops. Another dozen 
civilian refugees had mysteriously 
disappeared.
F in a l ly ,  the  Far E astern  
Economic Review  reported on 28 
August 1986 that “Son Sann has told 
ASEAN officials that he will take no 
further part in the political work of the 
Democratic Kampuchea coalition 
government until problems dividing 
factions in the resistance group are 
resolved”. The “CGDK President”, 
Norodom Sihanouk, extraordinarily 
referred to this report but did not deny 
it, in a tetter to the Review on 9 
October.
Thus, it appears that the UN now 
r e c o g n i s e s ,  as th e  le g i t im a te  
representative of the people of 
Kampuchea, an exiled “government” 
without a Prime Minister (Son Sann, 
now based in Paris) or even a full-time 
President. (S ihanouk , based in 
Pyongyang, has announced that he is 
spending six months of every year 
writing his memoirs.)1*
A retired Prime Minister and a 
part-time Prince are the thinnest 
possible facade of respectability for 
Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, The scandal 
of the world’s abandonment of the 
K a m p u c h e a n  p eop le  to  these  
genocidists might be less damning if 
the KPNLF's failure had at least 
begun as a “reasonably democratic” 
attempt.
On 10 April 1986, the Far Eastern 
Economic Review  reported that in 
June. ASEAN ministers would finalise 
“a detailed blueprint for a settlement 
of the Cambodia question":
The confidential outline attempts tosatisfy 
H ano i’s dem and that the withdrawal of its
troops from C am bodia be coupled with 
cessation o f  Chinese arms supplies to the 
Khmer resistance by proposing to station 
an international peace-keeping force 
along C am b o d ia ’s land and sea borders. 
The sea border is being specified to assure 
Vietnam and China would not be able to 
continue the supplies once the land routes
A retired prime minister 
and a part-time prince are 
the thinnest possible facade 
of respectability for Pol 
Pot’s Khmer Rouge.
from Thailand have been closed in the 
wake of a successful settlement.
However, within two weeks, China 
a n d  t h e  f o u r  “ D e m o c r a t i c  
Kampuchea’’ factions had over-ruled 
this initiative. The June ASEAN 
meeting, it appears, did not even 
discuss it. The irony is that even the 
KPNLF’s main supporter in the USA, 
Stephen J. Solarz, accepts that a 
continuing Vietnamese occupation is 
preferable to a Khmer Rouge return to 
power, while the KPNLF leaderships 
themselves claim the opposite.13
T w o r e c e n t  d e v e lo p m e n ts  
cncourage lingering hopes for a 
settlement. At the ASEAN meeting in 
Manila in June, Australian Foreign 
Minister Bill Hayden called for a 
tribunal to hear the case against Pol 
Pot’s Khmer Rouge leadership, over 
the massacre and starvation of a 
million people during their brief rule 
from 1975 to 1979. Such action would 
help remove the main obstacles to 
peace.
Secondly, on a recent visit to 
S ingapore ,  N orodom  S ihanouk 
agreed  with F o re ig n  M in is te r  
Dhanabalan that their negotiating 
position “could be improved upon to 
make it more acceptable to the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m m u n i ty  an d  
Vietnam”. According to the Straits 
Times (5 August 1986);
O t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  e l e m e n t s ,  M r .  
D hanabalan  said, such as the disarming of 
th e  f i g h t i n g  f o r c e s  a n d  h a v i n g  
international peace-keeping forces, could 
also be added ... Mr. D hanabalan said that 
Prince Sihanouk and he agreed that efforts 
would have to be made to persuade the 
Khmer Rouge to accept the new points. 
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